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Student Note
From Laggard to Leader: Canadian Lessons
on a Role for U.S. States in Making and
Implementing Human Rights Treaties
Koren L. Bellt
I. INTRODUCTION
Human rights treaty-making and implementation pose special
challenges for federal states. The unique quality of human rights-
inherent, universal, urgent, and compelling-and the existence of
entrenched domestic rights-protecting instruments give rise to
complexities that distinguish these treaties from their international
counterparts. Of particular and problematic significance for federal states is
the fact that human rights treaties "made" by the national government
often implicate the relationship between the individual and the sub-unit
government, requiring substantive compliance at the local level. In Canada
and the United States, the distinctive nature of human rights has colored
the process of treaty-making and implementation, posing delicate legal,
political, and practical questions about the division of powers in these
federal states. In response to these challenges, Canada has worked to
resolve the apparent tension between its federal structure and international
human rights law, while the United States has accepted and exploited a
zero-sum relationship between the two.
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2003; B.A. Swarthmore College, 1998. I would like to
thank Drew Days for encouraging me to pursue this research and supporting me in writing
this Note. For their insightful ideas and comments, thanks to Harold Koh, Michael Reisman,
Ruth Wedgwood, Karen Knop, Craig Scott, Anna Rich, and Claudio Arag6n. For their love
and endless support, thanks always to Mom, Steve, Lissy, Chris, Beni, and Amanda. I
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At the advent of the U.N. system and the creation of the human rights
instruments following World War II, both countries responded to the
obstacles posed by their federal systems with a policy and practice of non-
adherence. In the early 1970s, Canada changed course, transitioning to a
path of engagement marked by the will to balance federalism with respect
for international human rights law. To honor both values, Canada
developed a discrete mechanism that addressed the challenges posed by
human rights by recognizing a new role for the provinces in the treaty
process. In the years since, the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Continuing
Committee has facilitated continuous, dialectical consultation between the
federal and sub-unit governments at all stages of the treaty process,
making critical contributions that have enabled Canada to emerge as a
human rights leader.
Canada's transition to a course of leadership contrasts sharply with the
second path of qualified adherence pursued by the United States. This
approach assumes an antithetical relationship between federalism and
human rights law, building layers of resistance to meaningful ratification
and substantive compliance in order to enable the foreign policy gains of
signing treaties while minimizing political costs. Qualified adherence has
produced a highly complex and uncertain treaty scheme, badly in need of
rationalization and reform, along with substandard performance that has
earned the United States a reputation as one of the world's human rights
laggards.
The valuable lesson from the Canadian experience is that the
meaningful, structured inclusion of sub-unit voices in the dialogue on
human rights can work to dissolve the antagonism between federalism and
international human rights law, benefiting each. This Note will argue that
the United States would gain from a similar mechanism that would
recognize a new role for the states in the human rights treaty process by
facilitating "dialectical federalism."' The unique challenges posed by
human rights and the uncertain state of the present scheme create a
compelling case for a discrete mechanism that would complement the
formal scheme, making informal-but far-reaching -political, pragmatic,
and symbolic contributions to the human rights treaty process in the
United States.
In Part II, this Note surveys treaty-making and implementation in
Canada and the United States. Part III contrasts the relationship between
federalism and international human rights law in Canada and in the
United States, highlighting Canada's workable balance and the United
States' zero-sum approach. Finally, Part IV draws on the Canadian
experience to recommend a discrete role for the U.S. states in human rights
treaty-making and implementation.
1. This term appears in Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J. 1035 (1977).
[Vol. 5
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II. TREATY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES
As a highly decentralized federation, 2 Canada's treaty scheme is
perhaps the most complex in the world.3 Federal powers of treaty-making
and implementation are not concurrent, and jurisdiction over treaty
implementation is subject to the ordinary constitutional division of powers.
Formally, the "watertight compartments" 4 of Canadian federalism remain
intact in the realm of foreign affairs. In the case of human rights, an area of
near exclusive provincial jurisdiction, Canada's sub-units retain special
constitutional and political significance for the treaty process.
In contrast, the United States boasts a treaty scheme in which the
federal government's powers to make and implement treaties are
coextensive, and jurisdiction over activities reserved to the states in the
Tenth Amendment becomes immaterial in the treaty context. Formally,
Canada's scheme of "watertight compartments" is anathema to a U.S.
treaty process in which "state lines disappear." 5 As a result, unlike their
Canadian counterparts, the American states enjoy limited constitutional
relevance to international affairs. However, the states retain crucial
political significance in the treaty process, particularly in the realm of




The foundation of Canadian federalism is the Constitution Act of 1867,
the British North America Act (BNA). Like the U.S. Constitution, the BNA
divides legislative powers between national and sub-unit governments.
Unlike its U.S. counterpart, however, the BNA vests residual competence
in the national parliament,6 while the provinces enjoy exclusive
jurisdictional competence over several important areas, including
2. Canadian Embassy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Federalism
in Canada (May 1997), at http://www.canadianembassy.org/issues/federalism.htm (last
visited March 3, 2001).
3. Gerald Morris, Canadian Federalism and International Law, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 55 (R. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1974) [hereinafter
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES].
4. Att'y Gen. Canada v. Att'y Gen. Ontario [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) at 354 [hereinafter Labour
Conventions].
5. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
6. Section 91 stipulates that the national government may "make laws for the Peace,
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes
of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VI (Distribution of Legislative Powers), §91 (emphasis added).
2002]
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"Property and Civil Rights in the Province" and "Generally all Matters of a
merely local or private Nature in the Province."7
A 1937 opinion rendered by Lord Atkin in Attorney-General for Canada
v. Attorney-General for Ontario (the Labour Conventions case)8 definitively
established the law on treaties. At issue was whether the federal
Parliament had the authority to implement obligations incurred pursuant
to the government's treaty-making power. Significantly, the subject matter
of the treaty -the labor conventions adopted by the International Labour
Conference and ratified by the government of the day-involved an area
clearly within provincial competence. Writing for the Board, Lord Atkin
established three key principles: 1) there is no discrete category of "treaty
legislation" that the federal government can claim as a federal head of
power; 2) where the subject matter of the treaty falls within provincial
legislative competence, only the province can enact implementing
legislation; and 3) only through federal-provincial cooperation could
Canada execute international obligations implicating provincial heads of
power.9 Lord Atkin acknowledged that this scheme, born in a unitary state,
could become more "complex" when applied to federal states such as
Canada. 10 Nevertheless, the opinion closed with a metaphor expressing
deep faith in the sanctity of the division of powers and the possibility of
federal-provincial collaboration. "While the ship of state now sails on
larger ventures and into foreign waters," Lord Atkin stated, "she still
retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her
original structure."1 '
2. In Practice
Labour Conventions established an unwieldy treaty scheme. Despite
great controversy and judicial "tweaking" of the doctrine,12 however, it has
remained good law. Formally, Parliament has gained no power to legislate
in matters otherwise of provincial jurisdiction simply because an act seeks
to implement international treaty obligations. The judicial review of treaty-
implementing legislation is subjected to the same division-of-powers
inquiry applied to other laws, and this analysis will often require
7. Section 92 provides: "In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated..." Id.
The "property and civil rights" subsection, §92 (13), has been interpreted broadly. Id. § 92
(13). For a discussion of expansive provincial powers under the property and civil rights
clause of Section 92, see Richard H. Leach, Implications for Federalism of the Reformed
Constitution of Canada, in RESHAPING CONFEDERATION: THE 1982 REFORM OF THE CANADIAN
CONsTrrTION 149,151 (Paul Davenport & Richard H. Leach eds., 1984).
8. See supra note 4.
9. Morris, supra note 3, at 57.
10. Labour Conventions, supra note 4, at 348.
11. Id. at 354.
12. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Vapor Canada [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134; R. v. Crown Zellerbach
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 401. Together, these cases broadened the rule established in Labour Conventions
to allow greater scope to analyses of the validity of implementing legislation where the subject
matter of the treaty falls within provincial jurisdiction.
[Vol. 5
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provincial implementation.
In practice, the treaty-making and implementation process is more
nuanced and contentious than the formal scheme would suggest. The
Governor General in Council exercises the treaty-making power for the
Crown, acting almost invariably on the advice of the Prime Minister and
his Cabinet,13 who are responsible to the popularly elected House of
Commons. As a matter of law, "parliamentary consent is not required to
enter into an international agreement": the power to negotiate, conclude,
and ratify treaties is the sole authority of the executive.
14
Due to its parliamentary system, Canada's executive is usually able to
ensure the adoption of implementing legislation for subject matter that falls
within federal jurisdiction. Parliament's primary role comes into play after
the executive has ratified a treaty. In general, a ratified treaty will bind
Canada internationally but will only have domestic force if it is
implemented by legislation. 15 Although some treaties involve subject
matter that makes subsequent legislation unnecessary, 16 the general rule
requiring legislative implementation to incorporate conventional
international law into domestic law poses the complex parallel question of
what constitutes treaty-implementing legislation.
17
The Court's jurisprudence seems to require, at minimum, an express
reference to a convention in order to consider a statute as implementing
legislation. 18 However, the Department of External Affairs has suggested a
more flexible, trifurcated approach to identifying legislation as "treaty-
implementing":
Treaties require implementing legislation to make them effective in
domestic law.... If it is necessary to change domestic law in order
to enable Canada to discharge its treaty obligations this may be
done in a number of ways:
13. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CANADA, REPRESENTING THE CROWN IN
CANADA, at http://www.gg.ca/rolresp/crown e.html Oast modified 2000-05-01).
14. ANNE BAYEFSKY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: USE IN CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION 25 (1992). However, a form of informal parliamentary
assent is often sought for certain types of agreements. See Edward G. Lee, Canadian Practice in
International Law During 1985: At the Department of External Affairs, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 386,
398 (1986).
15. Exceptions include treaties that "give recognition to incidents of sovereignty" or
concern "matters in exclusively sovereign aspects," but could be fairly described as not
reaching matters that "affect the rights of individuals." R. J. MacDonald, The Relationship
between International Law and Domestic Law in Canada, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3,
at 120-21 (quoting Bitter v. Secretary of State of Canada, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 482, 697-8 and Francis
v. The Queen, [1956] 3 D.L.R (2d) 641, 647).
16. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 26.
17. Importantly, Canadian courts follow a rule of statutory interpretation analogous to the
United States' Charming Betsy doctrine. The presumption is that Parliament and the
legislatures do not intend to act in breach of Canada's international obligations, and thus that
the courts should construct domestic legislation in accordance with the convention to the
extent possible. See, e.g., Daniels v. the Queen [1968] S.C.R. 517 (Pigeon, J., concurring).
18. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 31-32.
2002]
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(a) by enacting the required legislation without express
reference to the treaty...
(b) by legislation which makes reference to the treaty but
without expressly enacting its provisions...
(c) by incorporating into law the treaty or the relevant
provisions.19
Human rights treaties offer an illuminating example of the intricacies
involved in this determination. The case of human rights is also especially
complex, and somewhat anomalous, because of the intimate role that
international human rights instruments played in the construction of
Canada's own constitutional bill of rights, the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
20
Under one view, scholars have argued that the omission of an express
reference signaling implementation of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other treaties to which Canada is a party
should not be dispositive in a determination of constitutional validity. This
19. Lee, supra note 14, at 401-02 (emphasis added).
20. Canada drafted its constitutional bill of rights concurrently with the proliferation of
the major contemporary international human rights norms and conventions (1968-82). The
country's parallel ratification of these treaties required a consideration of the adequacy of
domestic law. Records of the drafting process reflect the degree to which international norms
were enmeshed in the Charter's creation, revealing numerous suggestions (ultimately rejected
due to provincial concerns) that the Charter make express reference to the international
instruments that influenced its creation. Anne Bayefsky, International Human Rights in
Canadian Courts, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DoMEsTIc COURTS 307
(Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) [hereinafter Canadian Courts]. A study
of the drafting of individual provisions of the Charter leads to the conclusion that: a)
international human rights law was an important motivating factor throughout the fifteen
year effort to constitutionalize a bill of rights, and b) many specific Charter sections are
directly indebted in both language and intent to specific international law provisions. See
BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 59.
Since the introduction of the Charter, there has been a marked growth in the number of
cases that refer to human rights law in the course of interpreting domestic law. See, e.g.,
Slaight Communications v. Davidson [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (Dickson, C.J.) ("I believe that the
Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded
by similar provisions in international human rights documents that Canada has ratified.").
The uncertain reach of the Court's interpretive technique has resulted in calls to rationalize
this approach. See, e.g., BAYEFSKY, Canadian Courts, at 317-8; Stephen Toope, Canada and
International Law, 27 PROc. CAN. COUNCIL INTL L. 33, 35-6 (1998) (criticizing the Court's lack
of interpretive approach). But see Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic
Courts, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 506 (discussing the virtues of a relevant and persuasive
approach to interpretation, as opposed to the traditional "bindingness" model of
interpretation, as "a process of translation from international to national"). Various Justices of
the Supreme Court of Canada have also defended their use of international law as an
interpretive tool. See, e.g., Gerard V. La Forest, The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of
Canada in International Law Issues, 34 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 89 (1996) (examining the role of the
Court in fostering compliance with international law and promoting integration); Claire
L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the
Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15 (1998) (discussing the declining international influence of
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first approach proposes a model of "implicit incorporation," where the
answer to the question of implementation must' "be culled from a detailed
assessment of the legislative history of human rights law in Canada, the
position taken on the subject by Canadian representatives both in
international and domestic fora, and the few Canadian cases." 21 The
conclusion of this integrative approach is that Canada's human rights
treaties have been incorporated, in part, into domestic legislation.
22
A second view proposes an intermediate model of assessing
interpretation, one that falls between the Court's "express reference" rule
and the model of "implicit incorporation":
Canada's treaty obligations under human rights instruments can
therefore bind the courts if they meet two tests. They must be
reflected in legislation, either expressly or by necessary implication,
and such legislation must be an enactment of the legislature having
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the treaty.23
These interpretive questions about implementing legislation extend to
the Court's consideration of provincial laws. For instance, a 1994 decision
found the Manitoba implementation scheme for the Hague Convention
invalid because it contained both a general scheme for enforcement and an
implementing provision. 24 It is in the context of these complexities that
Canada's achievements as a world leader in human rights protection are
best appreciated.
B. The United States
The treaty scheme in the United States differs from its Canadian
counterpart in important ways. First, the U.S. Constitution provides
explicit textual authority for, and delegation of, the treaty power. Second,
to "make" a treaty, the President must obtain the consent of a super-
majority of the Senate, a body that he does not control. Third, treaties, once
ratified, have domestic legal force according to the Constitution. The U.S.
Congress has no necessary role in treaty implementation subsequent to
ratification; treaties are presumptively "self-executing" unless a condition
requiring legislative implementation is attached prior to ratification.
Finally, case precedent in the United States stands for the proposition that
the treaty power is not subject to the ordinary division of powers under the
Constitution, and therefore that federal treaty-making and implementing
powers are coextensive.
21. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 33.
22. Id. at 66.
23. WILLIAM SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN
CHARTER 22 (2d ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
24. Thomson v. Thomson [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551. Implementation of the Hague Convention
fell within provincial jurisdiction because it concerned matters of child custody.
2002]
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Despite differences that appear to free this scheme from many of the
complexities inherent in the Canadian process, the U.S. treaty process has
been far from uncontroversial. Though the United States does not face the
same constitutional problems that result from the Canadian treaty scheme,
federalism concerns have produced similar political difficulties.
1. Historical Overview
The constitutional treaty scheme grew out of the Founders' prior
experience, under the Articles of Confederation, with a federal government
unable to ensure state compliance with the country's international
obligations. 25 After significant dispute and compromise, 26 the Framers
granted the President the power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate;27 they provided that treaties, like U.S.
laws and the Constitution itself, would be the supreme law of the land,
binding on the states; 28 and they expressly denied treaty-making authority
to the states.29 This system of procedural checks and balances sought to
safeguard federalism, providing for the representation of national
interests30 while at the same time protecting those of the individual states.
31
25. The Treaty Clause in the Articles of Confederation was silent on whether treaties
would have domestic force. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX.
26. Extensive historical scholarship reviews the debates on the treaty power at the 1787
Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying conventions. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 316 (Max Farrand ed., 1937); 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 363 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888). For a more concise review, see
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
27. "He shall have Power, by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur[." U.S. CONsT. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
28. "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id. art. VI, sec. 1, cl. 2.
29. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation[.]" Id. art. I, sec. 10, cl.
1. Like their Canadian counterparts, U.S. states can enter into "agreements" (cl. 3) with foreign
powers. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITMTION 153 (1996). Despite
these specifications, the treaty power left much undefined. The Framers did not distinguish
treaties from other international agreements or obligations; they did not prescribe what
purposes treaties might serve, nor did they provide for limitations on their scope. They also
did not consider and suggest how to resolve potential conflicts between treaties and the
Constitution, or between treaties and laws, or between the treaty-makers and the law-makers.
Id. at 175.
30. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
31. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 444, n. 4. Out of concern for state interests, one scholar has
noted that the Framers:
created a procedure uniquely sensitive to, and capable of safeguarding,
state interests .... [T]he Senate, fortified by a minority veto, was charged
with the special... task of refusing its consent to any treaty that trenched
too far on the interests of the states without serving a sufficiently
powerful countervailing national interest.... The political safeguard goes
a long way in explaining why the Founders felt content with a system
that delegated the whole treaty power to the national government.
[Vol. 5
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2. In Practice
The President's formal role in treaty-making is clear. Like his Canadian
counterpart, he elects the country's treaty partners, decides the subject
matter of negotiations, appoints negotiators, and tracks their progress.
Unlike his Canadian counterpart, he must seek the consent of the Senate if
he approves of the result, and if he is successful, he can "make" the treaty.
32
The Senate's role in the process is more ambiguous. As originally
conceived, the Senate was to "advise" the President as well as to "consent"
to ratification, but in practice, its role has been confined to the latter
function.33 Although partisan politics historically influenced this check on
the executive's treaty power,34 in recent years, the system's safeguards
have functioned more constructively to promote national interests. Both
the practice of involving individual senators in negotiations and greater
informal consultation between the branches have worked to facilitate the
ratification of the majority of treaties submitted. 35 Nevertheless due to the
Senate practice of granting its consent subject to the package of
"reservations," "understandings," and "declarations" (RUDs) commonly
attached to treaties, differences between the Senate and the executive
branch have continued to hamper the treaty process during the second half
of the twentieth century. 36 While the President must ultimately enter these
conditions upon U.S. ratification, the Senate can threaten to withhold its
consent if the executive refuses to follow instructions. The constitutional
authority of the Senate to insist on these conditions has been the subject of
great debate and international criticism.
37
Once the Senate has granted its consent, the President again assumes
the lead role. He may decide whether to make the treaty, and after
ratification, attempts by the Senate to withdraw, amend or interpret its
consent have no legal force. Although the Senate does not retain these
powers in its "executive role" as co-treaty-maker, in its legislative capacity
post-ratification, the Senate does participate in any congressional actions
taken to affect the legal status of the treaty.38 This role gains crucial
significance in the context of the "non-self executing" declarations,
routinely attached to human rights treaties, which strip the treaty of
domestic legal force absent legislative implementation.
The Treaty Power has drawn particular fire39 based on federalism
concerns. The argument is one that resonates throughout the Canadian
Golove, supra note 26, at 1098-99.
32. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 177.
33. Id. at 177-78. Presidents have developed informal substitutes to fill this advisory void
(consultation with senators and appointment of senators to negotiation delegations).
34. Id. at 176.
35. Id. at 177-79.
36. Id. at 180.
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
38. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 184.
39. Id. at 189. For a discussion of other controversial areas, see id. at 185-89 (discussing
limitations on treaty scope); id. at 194-96 (discussing separation of powers limitations).
2002]
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experience: treaties cannot circumvent the Constitution's division of
powers to implicate matters reserved to the states by the constitutional
scheme and the Tenth Amendment. This claim was conclusively addressed
in the U.S. analogue to Canada's Labour Conventions case, the 1920
landmark decision of Missouri v. Holland.40 At issue in Holland was the
validity of an act of Congress passed pursuant to the conclusion of a treaty
between the United States and Canada that sought to protect migratory
birds. The statute was contentious because Congress had tried once before
to adopt the act in question through the ordinary legislative process. Two
lower courts had found the statute invalid on grounds that it fell outside
Congress's enumerated powers, and it was thought that a similar fate
awaited the statute on appeal to the Supreme Court. As an alternate means
to reach the same end, the government concluded the treaty, Congress
enacted the statute, and the Act arrived, once again, at the courthouse
door.
41
In effect, the question in Holland involved the validity of the statute
rather than the treaty itself. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes upheld
the act in a clear affirmation of the validity and supremacy of treaty
provisions that implicate matters otherwise within the scope of state
jurisdiction. In language that stands in stark juxtaposition to Lord Atkin's
description of "watertight compartments," Justice Holmes explained:
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for
the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with
but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly
to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action... [this
power] ... is not to be found.... The treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.
The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider
what this country has become in deciding what that Amendment
has reserved.
42
In contrast to the Canadian scheme, which lacks a discrete treaty
authority, the U.S. Treaty Power is a delegation to the federal treaty-
makers additional to and independent of the delegations to Congress. For
the purpose of domestic legislation, local subject matter may be "reserved
to the states" when it falls outside the scope of Congress's enumerated
powers; in the context of foreign affairs, these distinctions fall away. 4
3
That the Holland holding remains good law is not to say that the Treaty
Power is free from limitations in favor of the states. Particular states' rights,
activities, and properties are widely thought to be protected against federal
40. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
41. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 190.
42. 252 U.S. at 432-34 (emphasis added).
43. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 191.
[Vol. 5
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encroachment, even by treaty.44 Unlike their Canadian counterparts, U.S.
states cannot, as yet, assert a constitutional right to jurisdiction over these
matters in the realm of foreign affairs.45 This, of course, was Holland's
central holding. Instead, dicta by justices and scholars have done the work,
carving out hypothetical limitations on federal foreign affairs powers in
explicit constitutional guarantees to the states and in implied state
sovereignty and inviolability.46 Although the Supreme Court's recent
federalism jurisprudence has sparked fresh debate about whether Holland
remains good law, 47 the principal influence of the states in international
affairs remains that of partisan-political forces channeled through the
federal structure.
It is in this political power that the states most resemble their Canadian
counterparts. In principle, the Canadian and U.S. conceptions of their
respective treaty schemes could not be more different. In practice,
however, the conventional Canadian view of non-porous jurisdictional
boundaries has been challenged by the fact of fluid interaction and
collaboration among sub-unit "compartments." Likewise, in the United
States, the traditional view of the states' irrelevance in foreign affairs48 is
untrue to practice:
The continuous existence of the states as governmental entities and
their strategic role in the selection of the Congress and the
President are so immutable a feature of the system that their
importance tends to be ignored.... The actual extent of central
intervention in the governance of our affairs is determined far less by the
formal power distribution than by the sheer existence of the states and
their political power to influence the action of the national authority....
Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the
inherent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse,
44. Id. at 193.
45. Id. at 165-66 (noting that the Tenth Amendment was "circumvented in principle when
the Court accepted that the federal government has foreign affairs powers not expressly
enumerated in the Constitution; little was left of it in fact when the courts recognized vast
powers in Congress, and federal powers to make treaties and executive agreements, to do
other executive acts, and to make law through judicial power, without regard to reserved
states' rights.").
46. Justices have reasoned that a treaty cannot cede a state's territory without its consent,
though this remains contentious. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1889). Presumably,
the United States could not alter the republican character of state governments (by negative
implication from art. IV, sec. 4) or abolish all state militia (by negative implication from art. I,
sec. 8, cl. 16). Under the Eleventh Amendment, foreign governments and foreign nationals
cannot sue a state in U.S. courts, absent its consent. Furthermore, though state immunities
have been significantly reduced and state activities are generally subject to federal legislation,
the sovereign immunity of states may contemplate some local activities within exclusive state
jurisdiction in the realm of foreign affairs. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 166.
47. See infra Part III.B.4.
48. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1936) (stating that U.S. external powers are
"exercised without regard to state laws or politics."). Numerous Justices and commentators
have echoed this statement over the years - many of whom are known for their sensitivity to
states' rights. HENIN, supra note 29, at 149.
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necessitating the widest support before intrusive measures of
importance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily
to opposition grounded in resistance within the states.
49
Nowhere has the political clout of the states created more of a barrier to the
nation's international engagement than in the realm of human rights.
Here, an additional, critical difference between the two countries
comes to light. Canada, faced with intricate constitutional and political
obstacles, opted for a path of engagement and leadership on human rights
issues. In contrast, the United States, faced with lesser intrinsic constraints
on its treaty scheme, has resigned itself to a path of qualified adherence -a
course that has earned it a reputation as a human rights laggard, not a
leader, on the international stage.
III. FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Canada: A Workable Balance
The political exigencies of Canada's constitutional scheme have meant
that federal-provincial consultation has long been a modus operandi of
Canadian politics, even before Lord Atkin's famous call in Labour
Conventions. However, in the realm of international human rights
instruments implicating subject matter of near-exclusive provincial
jurisdiction, federal-provincial consultation was largely non-existent, and
then, following the advent of the U.N. system, 50 largely ineffectual. During
this period, Canada's response to the challenges posed by these treaties
was a slightly more progressive version of the path pursued by United
States: a route of non-adherence followed by limited adherence.
The early 1970s marked a period of growing friction in federal-
provincial relations regarding external affairs. 51 Writing at the time, Gerard
Morris captured the widespread feeling of frustration with the country's
constitutional scheme:
Under our present constitutional doctrine, it is just a little more
difficult for any government of Canada, no matter how
enlightened, to become an active world leader in the human rights
49. Id. at 168 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: the Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM L. REv. 543, 544, 558
(1966)) (emphasis added).
50. The first instruments included the U.N. Charter (1945); the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 8, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (IlI), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)
(nonbinding). The drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M 360 (1967) [hereinafter ICESCR] began in
1949. See United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://untreaty.un.org.
51. Morris, supra note 3, at 71.
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field. The additional burden of a more cumbersome method of
achieving the desired result may suffice, in fact, to render
leadership impossible, so far as national compliance with evolving
international standards is concerned.
52
Morris concludes that a new consultative mechanism is needed "to
reassure the provinces about Ottawa's good faith and to instill in them a
sense of meaningful involvement in the development of co-operative
foreign policies."
53
Growing frustration with the inadequacies of the scheme led to a major
development in joint participation in the promotion of human rights: the
first Federal-Provincial Ministerial Conference on Human Rights. The
Conference, convened in December 1975, marked a turning point in the
understanding of the shared responsibilities of the federal and provincial
governments in the field of human rights and represented the beginning of
a new era in the development of human rights in Canada.5
4
The Conference culminated in the establishment of a permanent
mechanism for federal-provincial-territorial consultation on human rights.
This discrete mechanism was designed to ensure that federal, provincial,
and territorial governments interact closely at all stages of the human
rights treaty process - from preparatory work to negotiation, drafting,
ratification, implementation, and reporting. Among the main provisions of
the mandate are: that extensive consultation occur through the Committee
prior to Canada's ratification or denunciation of any international human
rights instrument; that the Committee meet regularly to promote the
progressive implementation of international human rights instruments
(currently twice a year); and, more generally, that the Committee serve to
ensure continuity in the inter-governmental dialogue on human rights by
encouraging information exchange and research on topics relevant to
human rights.55
Beyond the provisions that ensure the provinces a voice in the human
rights dialogue at the domestic level, the Committee mandate goes far to
include the provinces in interactions on the international stage, without
disrupting the international order of State legal personality. The mandate
provides that each provincial and territorial government has the right to
prepare its own reports on human rights treaty implementation in its
jurisdiction to complement the federal government's report to the United
Nations, and that the federal government, acting in concert with the
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. at 68.
54. Philippe LeBlanc, Canada's Experience with United Nations Human Rights Treaties 2
(1994), available at http://www.unac.org/unreform/leblanc.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
55. The Human Rights Program of the Department of Canadian Heritage (formerly the
Department of the Secretary of State) acts as the permanent secretariat for the Committee and
as the primary information-exchange gateway between the international and domestic human
rights scenes and between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments. How Canada
Works with the United Nations, at http://www.pch.gc.ca/ddp-hrd/english/ipcda.htm (last
visited Mar. 9,2001) (on file with the Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal).
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provinces, will continue to exercise overall responsibility for the
presentation of these reports.5 6 Finally, the mandate stipulates that
provinces and territories can, if they desire, send a representative as part of
any delegation to an international meeting on Canada's reports; that the
federal government will keep the provinces .and territories regularly
informed of international developments in human rights that could impact
their jurisdictions; and that provinces can, when called for, send
communications to international bodies through federal channels.
5 7
In this way, the first Federal-Provincial Ministerial Conference gave
substance to Morris's call for a new consultative mechanism that would
assure the provinces "meaningful involvement" in the human rights treaty
process. Moreover, this regular, dialectical interaction has proved to be an
efficient and effective means to advance Canada's treaty ratification and
implementation. Canada's reports have been the most complete of any
member state, and the U.N. has referred to them as models for the
international community.5 8 Today, Canada is a party to all of the principal
United Nations human rights conventions and covenants. The Continuing
Committee was essential to the ratification of all but one of these
instruments.
5 9
1. The Federal-Provincial-Territorial Continuing Committee on
Human Rights
Canada's ratification of two progressive human rights instruments, the
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the same year that they
entered force at the U.N. marked an important first victory for Lord Atkin's
vision of fluid consultation. The additional ratification of the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, despite serious opposition from the Departments of
56. Both Covenants, as well as other international human rights instruments, establish
"measures of implementation": international methods for the supervision of compliance by
states parties. In the case of the Covenants, 18-member Committees review the periodic
reports required of countries, evaluate country compliance, and publish their findings in an
annual document circulated to the General Assembly. Thomas Buergenthal, International
Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1, 12
(1988).
57. How Canada Works with the United Nations, supra note 55.
58. See LeBlanc, supra note 54.
59. Canada ratified the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
(1976); The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) (1981); The Convention Against Torture (CAT) (1987); The Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) (1991); and the Optional Protocol to the CRC (2000). The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965), is the one major human rights instrument that was signed (1966)
and ratified (1970) by Canada before the Continuing Committee was established, but the
process of acquiring provincial assent was far from easy. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 50
(noting that ratification required five years of federal-provincial negotiation). Moreover, it is
perhaps under this Convention that Canada has been found in the most significant breach of a
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Justice and External Affairs, 60 sent a clear message of commitment to the
international community that was further vindication for Canada's new
consultative machinery.
Following ratification, the Committee has played an important role in
coordinating implementation efforts. Chief among these was the
Committee's role in the drafting of section 15, the equality rights provision
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 61 At a 1981 Conference,
the ministers issued a joint statement reminding the Government that
"each government undertook to ensure that current and future legislation
is compatible with Canada's international obligations." At the same
Conference, the ministers reviewed a document entitled "Areas of
Deficiency Requiring Ministerial Attention with Respect to International
Covenants" which emphasized that the equality or non-discrimination
provision of the ICCPR and other provisions of the ICESCR
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of status. This concept is
extremely wide and could include discrimination on grounds of
physical and mental handicap.... Consideration should, therefore,
be given to increasing the number of prohibited grounds of
discrimination if Canada is to meet its obligations under the two
Covenants.
62
Proof of the Committee's ability to serve as an engine of progressive
change on the domestic front came in the form of Mr. Chr~tien's response:
on February 17, 1981, the Minister of Justice presented in 'the House of
Commons a revised Proposed Resolution to amend the Constitution to
include "mental or physical disability" 63 as a protected status.
The Committee's role also has been important to the expedient
ratification of other principal human rights instruments. Of particular note
is the small time lapse between signature and ratification of human rights
treaties since the Committee's inception, in contrast to the longer five-year
span that was required to complete the process for the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the one major
Convention ratified before the establishment of the Committee. 64
In addition, the post-ratification facilitative role of the Committee has
been crucial to Canada's adherence to these instruments. In Canada's first
report on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in May 1983, the Committee
60. The Optional Protocol was controversial because it allows individuals to bring
complaints against their country before an international body for violations of their rights
under the ICCPR. The Department of Justice worried, in particular, that Canada would suffer
international embarrassment if a province were to be found in breach of an article. See
LeBlanc, supra note 54 (describing the complaints filed and Canada's response).
61. See supra note 20 for a discussion of the influences of international law on its drafting.
62. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting Federal Document: 830-89/008 at 2, n. 1 and 3
(Ottawa, February 2-3, 1981)).
63. Id.
64. See supra note 59.
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could assert that, due to its machinery, "all governments in Canada have
undertaken to give effect to the provisions of the Convention by amending
domestic law to make it consistent with the Convention if ... necessary....
The provincial and federal human rights acts/ codes are important statutes
implementing the Convention." 65 Another successful example is the
ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), pursuant to which
Canada undertook to amend the Criminal Code to make torture an
indictable offense. 66 In a bold move, the amendment was coupled with
another provision granting Canadian courts universal jurisdiction over
defendants accused of torture. Two additional provisions were enacted to
give effect to obligations that required states, under other international
instruments and customary law, to cooperate in the prosecution of those
responsible for gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.
67
The case of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) represents
a slightly less successful example of the Canadian consultative machinery
at work. Following Committee consultation with the governments and the
non-governmental sector, Canada ratified the Convention with two
reservations 68 and a statement of understanding.69 Moreover, Canada's
ratification of the Covenant broke precedent by moving ahead without
unanimity. When the province of Alberta declined to consent to
ratification, the Government chose to proceed with the process. 70 Since
ratification, implementation has encountered similar difficulties: neither
the provincial legislatures nor the federal Parliament have undertaken
adoption of implementing legislation.71
65. BAYEFSKY, supra note 14, at 52, 55 (quoting Department of the Secretary of State,
Report of Canada, Convention on the Elimination All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, May 1983, No. S2-104/1983E (Ottawa: 1983), at xi, 3).
66. LeBlanc, supra note 54.
67. SCHABAS, supra note 23, at 28-29.
68. Reservations are to Article 37(c) and to article 21. LeBlanc, supra note 54, at 7.
69. Canada entered a statement of understanding regarding the rights of minority groups
to ensure that these rights are considered in the interpretation and application of the
Convention. Id.
70. Alberta's position seemed to arise from a concern that the rights enshrined in the
Convention could infringe the rights of parents. In a press release announcing the ratification,
the Government explained: "the provinces and territories have reviewed their existing
legislation.. .some provinces and territories have in fact indicated their support for ratification
formally, and others may do so in the very near future." Id.
71. Gibran Van Ert, International Law in Canada: Principles, Customs, Treaties and Rights
116 (2000) (unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Toronto) (on file with the
author). Van Ert notes that the usual practice for implementing legislation in the federal
Parliament is for it to be drafted by a government department and brought to the floor of the
House by that department's Minister. In the case of this Convention, an opposition member
brought a private member's bill to implement the treaty. The bill died on the Order Paper
after the parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister spoke for the government against the
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2. Baker v. Canada: Implications of the Consultative Process
One recent case, Baker v. Canada,72 affords an illuminating, concrete
assessment of the Continuing Committee's contributions. At issue in Baker
was the exercise of administrative discretion, pursuant to Section 114(2) of
the Immigration Act, to deport a Jamaican woman who was a long-term
undocumented resident with Canadian children. The Minister had denied
Ms. Baker's appeal for permanent residence status on "humanitarian and
compassionate grounds."
Ms. Baker asked the Court to interpret the Charter to protect a range of
rights enshrined in the CRC, as well as in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. To
reach the conclusion that the Minister's exercise of discretion had been
discriminatory and unreasonable, 73 the Court addressed a crucial question:
were the Minister's discretionary powers under the Act constrained by
Canada's international obligations under the treaty, despite the fact that
Parliament had not implemented the CRC into Canadian law?
In a 5-2 decision, the Court reasoned that the Minister's discretion
under the Act was limited by the CRC on the grounds that the
presumption of compliance with international law
74  extends to
unimplemented, as well as implemented, treaties. The majority explained:
"the reasons of the immigration officer show that his decision was
inconsistent with the values underlying the grant of the discretion," values
that included the importance of children's rights in Canada, as enshrined
in international law. For the majority, this use of the CRC was merely an
orthodox application of the treaty presumption to section 114(2) that did
not implicate the well-established rule requiring implementation for
treaties to have legal effect. In dissent, two justices contended that this use
of the presumption gave domestic force to international obligations
assumed without legislative consent.
Importantly, the dissent's argument that the majority's decision
violated separation of powers principles can be extended to questions of
federalism. Though the Court did not reach this issue, the holding would
likely be applicable to provincial statutes,75 such that the "values
underlying [provincial officers'] grant of discretion" would include
unimplemented treaties as well. In light of the consultative machinery of
the Continuing Conmmittee, this scenario gives reason for pause.
On the one hand, the majority's use of the treaty presumption would
seem to undermine the dialectical process through which the federal
72. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
73. Records show that the Minister had used factors such as Ms. Baker's problems with
mental illness, her position as a single mother, her recourse to the welfare system, and her
failure to contribute to Canadian society due to a lack of skills other than those of a domestic
worker, as grounds for the denial of her petition. Craig Scott, Canada's International Human
Rights Obligations and Disadvantaged Members of Society: Finally into the Spotlight?, 10 CONST. F.
97, 100 (1999).
74. For an explanation of this rule of statutory interpretation, see supra note 17.
75. The treaty presumption is applied to all statutes, federal and provincial, based on the
fact that all legislatures are presumed not to violate international law. See id.
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government and provincial sub-units opted to ratify, but not to implement,
the CRC. This scenario might be especially problematic in the case of
Alberta, given the province's failure to assent to ratification. Under a
different view, however, the Committee would serve to justify the Court's
extension of the treaty presumption to unimplemented treaties, precisely
because the provinces (save Alberta) had entered the "interpretive
community" of the treaty by assenting to ratification via the Committee
machinery. 76 The application of the values enshrined in the treaty to those
underlying provincial officers' discretionary powers, then, should pose few
problems for Canada's constitutional scheme. In this view, the Committee
process legitimates the majority's use of the presumption by resolving the
"democratic deficit" that might have otherwise resulted from a treaty-
making scheme that did not involve dialectical consultation with the sub-
units. The process also functions as a safety net that allows for the
integration of human rights norms into the domestic legal system through
a multitude of channels, without circumventing the representative process.
In the interim between Baker and the Court's consideration of the question
in the provincial context, this analysis of the Committee should reassure
those who worry that progressive respect for international human rights
jeopardizes the integrity of the federal system.
B. The United States
1. A Zero-Sum Approach
As in Canada, the international human rights instruments77 that
emerged following World War II presented new challenges for the U.S.
constitutional system because they implicated the relationship between the
individual and the sub-unit governments. In light of Holland, and in the
context of the early years of the civil rights movement and the Cold War,
debate centered on the domestic implications of ratifying progressive
human rights instruments that involved matters otherwise within the
scope of state jurisdiction. The main concern of states' rights advocates in
the United States mirrored that of their Canadian counterparts: the treaty
power would provide the federal government with a pretext to circumvent
constitutional limitations on its power.
In the face of the new U.N. instruments, the anti-civil rights and states'
rights forces voiced two main contentions: first, that the U.N. Charter's
human rights provisions would grant Congress the power to enact civil
rights legislation otherwise outside the scope of its constitutional powers;
76. Admittedly, this reasoning works better in theory than in practice. As the lengthy
Baker litigation illustrates, it is not always easy to separate assent to the values underlying a
treaty from the assumption of practical financial and administrative burdens that occurs
through the formal legislative process.
77. See supra note 50.
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and second, that the U.N. Charter would preempt state laws by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause. In addition, these advocates expressed unease
about the erosion of U.S. sovereignty and independence that might result
from international engagement on these issues.78 From 1950-53, these
concerns converged in an attack on Holland that included proposed
amendments to the Constitution to prevent U.S. ratification of the human
rights instruments and, in particular, desegregation by international treaty.
Known jointly as the "Bricker Amendment," these proposals included a
provision to overrule Holland and make all treaties non-self-executing: "A
treaty shall become effective in the United States only through legislation
which would be valid in the absence of a treaty." 79
In the end, the amendment failed but its proponents achieved their
goals through other means. In exchange for the amendment's defeat, the
Eisenhower Administration agreed to refuse to sign the emerging human
rights conventions.8 0 And, although the administration continued to seek
the Senate's advice and consent for the Genocide Convention, a 1955 State
Department circular affirmed the arrangement in no uncertain terms.
"Treaties," it stated, "are not to be used as a device for the purpose of
effecting internal social changes or to try to circumvent the constitutional
procedures established in relation to what are essentially matters of
domestic concern."81
In retrospect, the bargain proved a poor one for the proponents of
human rights. If adopted, the Bricker Amendment would have constricted
the treaty power, but it would not have impeded U.S. ratification of the
human rights instruments or their implementation by Congress. Indeed, as
the civil rights movement gained domestic ground, the fear of progressive
change through international treaty ceased to be an issue. 82
Unfortunately, history was set upon a different course. The price to be
paid for the defeat of the Bricker Amendment was a high one indeed:
nearly three decades of non-adherence to human rights instruments. 83 And,
as distinguished from the similar course pursued by Canada during this
period, the Eisenhower Administration's promise of non-adherence
78. Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149
U. PA. L. REv. 399, 411 (2000) [hereinafter Treaties].
79. Louis Henkin, The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348 (1995) [hereinafter
Ghost].
80. Thomas Healy, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1732-33 (1998).
81. Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 78, at 413 (quoting U.S. State Department
Circular No. 175, 1 2 (Dec 13, 1955)).
82. Following the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the courts
enforced desegregation without any human rights act or congressional legislation. "Within a
few years it became clear that the powers of Congress -notably the Commerce Power and the
power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment-were broad enough to encompass civil
rights legislation, without recourse to the Treaty Power." Henkin, Ghost, supra note 79, at 349.
83. While the United States continued to attend the debates in the Commission and the
Third Committee of the General Assembly concerning the drafting of the ICCPR, the country
did not play an active role and abstained from voting. William Schabas, Invalid Reservations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 277, 279 (1995).
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marked a regression in the nation's initial course of constructive
engagement in the drafting process-a clear example of a national
authority captive to the constraints of its federal system.
2. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
As the Eisenhower arrangement proved to be increasingly
inconvenient for U.S. foreign policy interests, successive administrations
gradually moved away from the practice. Finally, the official policy of non-
adherence, to human rights instruments changed with the Carter
Administration's submission of a package of treaties to the Senate in
197884 - an initiative that met with opposition reminiscent of earlier
debates.
Faced with the package of human rights treaties, Senator Bricker's
successors responded with a package of their own: a set of reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs) to condition their consent,
accommodating domestic concerns while allowing the United States to
reap the foreign policy benefits of adherence. These RUDs respond to
concerns about substance, scope, and structure: reservations are attached to
withhold U.S. commitment to particular substantive treaty provisions;
declarations are attached to make treaties non-self-executing so that they
require implementation through the bicameral process to gain domestic
force; and understandings are attached to clarify the scope of U.S. consent
and to alert treaty partners that the implementation of certain provisions
will be subject to the country's federal structure.8 5
For Senator Bricker's successors, the RUDs have proved to be the
perfect solution to the problem -one that has, in many ways, allowed the
U.S. to "have its cake and eat it too." Once set upon this second course of
qualified adherence, ratification has been far from expedient, and
necessary implementation and reporting sub-standard. 86 To this day, the
United States has yet to ratify major human rights instruments. 87 As one
scholar recounts:
The belated ratification of the [ICCPR] ... completed a process
84. The package included the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (1966); the ICESCR (1966); the ICCPR (1966); and the American
Convention on Human Rights (1969). See http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/treaties.htm. In
1980, the Administration submitted the CEDAW (1980) to the Senate. Bradley & Goldsmith,
Treaties, supra note 78, n. 78.
85. Id. at 401. RUDs cover a variety of subjects and take different forms. For the text of
these RUDs, see http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2002).
86. Conversation with Harold Koh, Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Mar. 2001). See
also Ann Fagan Ginger, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1341 (1993) (discussing laggard implementation and reporting in the case of the ICCPR).
87. The United States has yet to ratify the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR and the
ICESCR (signed Oct. 5,1977), CEDAW (signed July 17, 1980), CRC (signed Feb. 16, 1995), or
the Optional Protocol to the CRC (signed July 5, 2000).
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begun forty-five years earlier by Eleanor Roosevelt... In February
1978, President Jimmy Carter submitted the Covenant to the
Senate.... However, the matter was not further pursued under the
Reagan administration. Finally,... President Bush resubmitted
the treaty to the Senate, accompanied by... no less than five
reservations, four interpretive declarations and five
"understandings" - an unprecedented number.88
That this second course of qualified adherence has not been a dramatic
change from the years of non-adherence has not escaped watchful eyes at
home and abroad. Though U.S. courts have enforced the package without
assessing its legality in any detail, 89 extensive literature has criticized the
Senate practice and questioned the validity of each of the component parts
on grounds of international and U.S. law, both substantive and symbolic. 90
Scholars have also considered whether the current path of qualified
adherence is actually an improvement.
At one extreme, Louis Henkin contends that the United States would
have done better to follow its initial course of non-adherence. U.S. RUDs,
he explains, achieve "virtually what the Bricker Amendment sought, and
more.... Senator Bricker lost his battle, but his ghost is now enjoying
88. Schabas, supra note 83, at 280.
89. This is because the text of the Constitution gives little information about the treaty-
making process, and because the creation and enforcement of treaties are heavily influenced
by political factors and are thus "political questions." Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra
note 78, at 440-41.
90. For a fierce critique of each of the five categories of RUDs, see generally Henkin, Ghost,
supra note 79. But see Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 78 (defending each of the five
categories of RUDs). For a discussion of RUDs in the context of the ICCPR, see Schabas, supra
note 83 (surveying the RUDs to conclude that many are invalid). But see Jack Goldsmith,
Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 Ci. J. INT'L L. 327 (2000)
(defending the RUDs under the ICCPR).
For a survey of the doctrine of non-self executing treaties, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). For a historical
analysis of the validity of the non-self-executing declaration, see John Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLuM. L. REV.
1955 (1999) (challenging the legal orthodoxy that the "Supremacy Clause requires courts to
automatically enforce treaties subject to narrow exceptions."). But see, e.g., Martin. S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the
Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999) (rebutting Yoo's contention on historical grounds);
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154 (1999) (rebutting Yoo on
doctrinal and structural grounds).
Reservations raise the complex issue of what operative effect a treaty has for a reserving
party, once their reservations have been declared invalid. Schabas, supra note 83, at 278 ("[]f
the invalid reservations can be severed or separated from U.S. accession to the treaty, then the
United States remains bound by the Covenant, including its provisions dealing with the death
penalty .... Alternatively, if the invalid reservations cannot be separated from the U.S.
accession, then the United States is not a party to the instrument."). But see HENKIN, supra note
29, at 452, n. 29 (arguing that "if the Senate gave its consent only on condition.., the treaty
could take effect only subject to that condition"); Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 78,
at 438 ("U.S. RUDs were clearly a condition of U.S. ratification... either the United States is
not a party to the treaty provisions with respect to which it has reserved (which yields the
same result as if the RUDs were enforced), or the United States is not a party to the treaty at
all.").
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victory in war.... U.S. ratification practice threatens to undermine a half-
century of effort to establish international human rights standards in
international law."91 Professors Bradley and Goldsmith disagree. They
counter that RUDs are a "reasonable and largely successful response to...
competing [international and domestic] pressures" 92 that have exposed
U.S. human rights practices to international scrutiny, while at the same
time protecting important domestic prerogatives. In their view, the Senate
practice has saved the United States from incurring international legal
commitments that it "cannot" meet for constitutional or political reasons,
and it has protected the principles regarding the separation of powers and
federalism.
93
A moderate view is expressed by Thomas Buergenthal, the U.S.
representative to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, a body that has
been vocal in its opposition to RUDs. Buergenthal distinguishes himself
from Henkin's position, noting that conditioned ratification has made
important substantive and symbolic contributions:
it is clear that the U.S. assumed significant international human
rights obligations under international law with regard to those
international human rights that do not conflict with U.S. law. This is so
because ratifications have the effect of internationalizing these
rights, thus obligating the United States to protect such rights both
as a matter of domestic and international law.... [This] is a major
step forward.94
Nevertheless, he concedes that RUDs are "neither constitutionally
necessary nor compatible with the long-term interest of the United States in
promoting the world-wide observance of human rights." Indeed, he faults
this practice for the country's laggard reputation: "the United States has
moved from being a pioneer in [the area of human rights] to being a
country that.., puts increasing obstacles in the way of giving domestic
effect to its international legal obligations." 95
Despite different interpretations, these three scholars share
assumptions that have been drawn to effect a zero-sum choice between
respect for the federal system and international human rights law. And yet,
the Canadian experience tells a different, valuable story of two principles
that are not mutually exclusive, but mutually constructive. In short, RUDs
are neither a good way to promote human rights, nor the best way to
ensure respect for the federal system.
91. Henkin, Ghost, supra note 79, at 349.
92. Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 78, at 467.
93. Id. at 468.
94. Thomas Burguenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 211-12 at n. 3 (1997) (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 212.
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3. Understanding Federalism Understandings
The ambiguous language of the federalism understandings
96
systematically attached to human rights treaties has produced uncertainty
and discord about what these conditions actually mean. At one end of the
spectrum, Louis Henkin has argued that these understandings serve "no
legal purpose." In his view, the statements are "deeply ambiguous"
because the federal government necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all
matters covered in human rights instruments pursuant to the Treaty Power
and is free to implement treaties in the manner it sees fit.97 As such,
understandings are just "another sign" of U.S. resistance to human rights
agreements, "setting up obstacles to their implementation and refusing to
treat human rights conventions as treaties dealing with a subject of
national interest and international concern." 98 Though seconding Henkin's
views, Gerard Neuman sees this sign in a different light. For him, the
understanding does "signal the political reality" to U.S. treaty partners
"that some members of Congress are reluctant to exercise existing federal
power to enforce" treaties in areas otherwise within state jurisdiction.99
Jordan Paust attributes to the "signaling function" a meaning even slightly
more robust: "federal clauses allow state participation through law
affirming or effectuating choice while assuring concurrent duties to
implement the treaties through federal and state processes." 100
Official statements from the former Bush and Clinton administrations
adopt a view that fuses the Neuman and Paust readings. The Senate
explained that the Bush Administration's understanding attached to the
ICCPR "serves to emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the
constitutional balance of authority between the State and Federal
governments." 101 The Clinton Administration seconded: "there is no
96. The phrasing of the understandings attached to the CAT and the CERD closely
parallels that of the ICCPR:
[T]his Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to
the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that the state and local governments exercise
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures
appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the
state or local governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of
the Convention.
Understanding No. 5 Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 659 (1992) (emphasis added). The U.S. federalism understanding to the
Charter of American States is less ambiguous that those conditioning the human rights
instruments. OAS Charter, Apr. 30,1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2484.
97. Henkin, Ghost, supra note 79, at 345-46. See also Gerald Neuman, The Global Dimension
of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 33,52 (1997).
98. Henkin, Ghost, supra note 79, at 346.
99. Neuman, supra note 97, at 52-53 (referring specifically to the ICCPR).
100. Jordon Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are the Law of the
United States, 20 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 301, 328 (1999).
101. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23 (2d Sess. 1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 649
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disposition to preempt these state and local initiatives or to federalize the
entire range of anti-discriminatory actions through the exercise of the
treaty power."10 2 Importantly, the Bush Administration clarified, "the
intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but
rather to put our future treaty partners on notice with regard to the
implications for our federal system concerning implementation."
10 3
Finally, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith offer an interpretation more
deeply ambiguous than the provision itself. They concede that the
understandings do not relieve the federal government of responsibility for
implementation but at the same time contend that the conditions "are not
intended to compel state action." They conclude that "it is wrong to
assume that it is the understandings that might make treaty compliance 'a
matter of the states' option-the understandings merely highlight the
possibility that the federal structure of the Constitution may have this effect."'
°4
In effect, Bradley and Goldsmith present the federal government and
individual states' governments as beholden to an all-powerful, monolithic
"federal system" that will, alone, decide the fate of a non-self-executing
treaty. But what is this "system" but its component parts in dynamic
interaction?
Yet, Bradley and Goldsmith are not the only commentators who adopt
this flat view of the federal system in conceptualizing the tension between
federalism and international human rights law. To an extent, all of these
interpretations evince a simplistic view of "the system" as the constraint to
substantive adherence to these treaties. Here, the Canadian experience is
again instructive: by recognizing the fluid multiplicity of political forces
channeled through the federal system, "the system," as a unit, ceased to
impede human rights treaty-making and implementation. Instead, the
component forces became flexible, partner-participants in the human rights
goals of the federal government, exerting their political power through
negotiation and cooperation, as well as conflict and opposition. The
important lesson from the Canadian experience is that by recognizing the
independent agency of the system's sub-units and granting them
authorship in the creative process, the antagonism between federalism and
human rights treaties dissolves, and both values benefit.
(1992) [hereinafter ICCPR Report].
102. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-29 at 24 (1994). An
executive order by President Clinton evinces a similar equivocal attitude towards
implementation: "it shall be the policy and practice of the Government of the United
States.... to fully respect and implement its obligations under the international human rights
treaties to which it is a party." Though the choice of the word "shall" suggests an obligatory
command, the Order goes on to state that it "does not impose any justifiable obligations on
the executive branch." Exec. Order No. 13107,63 Fed. Reg. 68991 (1998).
103. ICCPR Report, supra note 101.
104. Bradley & Goldsmith, Treaties, supra note 78, at 455-6 (emphasis added).
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4. The Court and the Treaty Power: Federalism Jurisprudence and
Breard v. Greene
Ironically, the debate over the meaning of ambiguous federalism
understandings and their effect on treaty-implementation may only find
decisive resolution in the voice that has yet to weigh in: the Supreme
Court. The United States' conditioned ratification of human rights treaties
has coincided with the Court's growing concern about the integrity of the
federal system.10 5 In recent jurisprudence, the Court has expressed the view
that the safeguards of the political system do not adequately protect
federalism. 0 6 These decisions have widened the divide between the treaty-
making and legislative powers,10 7 raising questions about whether Holland
will remain good law. Of particular concern is whether the principle
prohibiting the "commandeering" of state governments might be used to
invalidate treaties implemented through congressional legislation that
directs state officials to execute federal regulations pursuant to obligations
incurred1 °8 Though academe's hypotheses will have to await confirmation
from the Court, there has been at least one recent sign that the Court's
federalism jurisprudence might be extended to foreign affairs. The 1998
decision in Breard v. Greene'° 9 offers an illuminating case study of how
federalism has been used as an obstacle to the respect for, and adherence
105. This jurisprudence has coincided with the increasing involvement of state and local
governments in foreign affairs, and a shift away from foreign affairs exceptionalism. See
Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1089, 1097, 1105
(1999) (exploring reasons for this shift).
106. Healy, supra note 80, at 1727-28 (describing the Court's recent jurisprudence as
adopting "a new overriding approach to federalism that protects the states from a broad
range of overreaching."). In a string of decisions, the Court has restricted the scope of
legislative power under Article I, section 8 and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see,
e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); it has
reinforced the sovereign immunity of states in federal as well as state courts on questions of
federal law; see e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); and, it has prohibited the "commandeering" of state governments; see Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
107. The Court's bold federalism jurisprudence, demonstrated by the anticommandeering
principle, has not produced similarly bold deference to state sovereignty in preemption law.
See, e.g., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). Among others, Mark
Tushnet has warned that the Court's failure to address the disparate treatment of affirmative
and "negative" commandeering will work to undermine the reach of the anticommandeering
principle. See Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TuLSA L.J.
11, 14 (2000).
108. Numerous prominent scholars have pondered the effect of this federalism
jurisprudence, mainly the "anticomandeering" principle, on the treaty scheme. See, e.g., Healy,
supra note 80; Flaherty, supra note 90; Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MicH. L. REv. 390, 409 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power,
70 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1317, 1336 (1999); HENKiN, supra note 29, at 467, n. 75; Neuman, supra note
97, at 52.
109. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). For a detailed account of the complex proceedings surrounding
the case, see Jonathan Charney & Michael Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666
(1998).
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to, international human rights law.
Breard is a complex case, unique because of its unprecedented
proceedings. Among the distinguishing features of the case are a claim by a
foreign government against a U.S. state, a conflict with the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the important involvement of two components of the
executive branch, 110 and almost universal rebuke from the international
community and academic commentators."1  An overview of the
proceedings speaks volumes about how the federal government has
provoked, and invoked, an antagonistic relationship between federalism
and international human rights law.
Angel Breard was a Paraguayan national arrested in 1992 by the
Virginia authorities for murder and attempted rape. The Virginia
authorities failed to advise Breard of his right under the Vienna
Convention to inform the Paraguayan consulate of his arrest.
112
Subsequently, Breard was convicted of the charge and was sentenced to
death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, and the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari.13
In 1996, Paraguayan officials learned of Breard's conviction and sought
to advise him. In August of the same year, Breard filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court, contending mainly that Virginia's
violation of the Vienna Convention rendered his conviction invalid." 4 In a
move deferential to state sovereignty, the court denied relief on the
grounds that Breard had procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to
present it in state courts, and the court of appeals later affirmed."
5
In September of 1996, the Republic of Paraguay brought suit in federal
district court against the Commonwealth of Virginia. Among other claims,
Paraguay asserted that Virginia's failure to advise the consulate of Breard's
arrest had violated the Vienna Convention. This time, the district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on grounds of
110. Curtis Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REv. 529, 532 (1999).
111. Criticism focused on the symbolic aspects of the case, see, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708 (1998); the political aspects, see, e.g. Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICI Orders of Provisional
Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998); and the legal aspects, see, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional
Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1998); Lori Damrosch,
The Justiciability of Paraguay's Claim of Treaty Violation, 92 AM. J. INT'L L 697 (1998); Jordan
Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular Convention, 92 J. AM. INT'L L. 691
(1998) and Frederic L. Kirgis, Zschernig v. Miller and the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 704
(1998). But see Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S.
Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998) (arguing that, although these critiques are
understandable, they give insufficient consideration to state sovereignty as protected in the
Constitution).
112. Bradley, Breard, supra note 110, at 532-33.
113. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d. 670, 682 (Va. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971,
971 (1994).
114. Bradley, Breard, supra note 110, at 534.
115. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.Supp. 1255, 1263-65 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd sub nom., Breard
v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed.1 16 In
1998, Paraguayan officials and Breard filed petitions for writs of certiorari
in the Supreme Court. Virginia announced the date for Breard's execution
as April 14 of the same year.
11 7
Eleven days before the date of execution, Paraguay filed suit against
the United States in the ICJ. Pursuant to Paraguay's request for provisional
measures, the ICJ indicated that "the United States should take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that.. .Breard is not executed pending
the final decision of these proceedings."118 Subsequent to the ICJ indication,
Breard and the Paraguayan authorities filed two motions for relief in the
Supreme Court. These motions argued that, as "supreme law of the land;"
the Vienna Convention trumped the procedural default doctrine, and that
the Court had a duty to enforce the ICJ decision as binding domestic law.119
In response, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief requesting
that the certiorari petition and related motions be denied. The Solicitor
General argued that, pursuant to Virginia's violation of the Convention,
the United States had accorded Paraguay the traditional remedy (a formal
apology and a pledge to improve future compliance); that the Vienna
Convention provided no basis for vacating the conviction; and that the ICJ
order was not binding on the United States.1 20 Moreover, the Solicitor
General contended that even if the ICJ order were binding, the federal
government, including the Supreme Court, lacked the authority to stay the
execution. He explained: "our federal system imposes limits on the federal
government's authority to interfere with the criminal justice system of the
States. ... The 'measures at our disposal' under our Constitution may in
some cases include only persuasion ... that is the situation here."1 21
The Department of State signed the brief,122 voicing approval for this
robust view of state sovereignty, and the Supreme Court declined to stay
Breard's execution.' 23 The same day, the Secretary of State's attempt to
reach a diplomatic solution betrayed the Administration's sympathies.
After describing the government's vigorous attempts to defend Virginia's
right to execute Breard before the ICJ, Albright requested a stay "with great
reluctance" - based not on respect for international law, but on her
"responsibility to bear in mind the safety of Americans overseas" and the
"possible negative consequences for the many U.S. citizens who live and
116. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1273 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d.
622, 627-8 (4th Cir. 1998).
117. Bradley, Breard, supra note 110, at 535.
118. 37 I.L.M. 810, 819 (1998).
119. Bradley, Breard, supra note 110, at 537.
120. Id.
121. Charney & Reisman, supra note 109, at 673 (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390)).
122. Id. at 672.
123. The Court noted that while it was "unfortunate that [the motion for a stay] comes
before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ," it was the prerogative of the
Governor of Virginia to decide the matter, and "nothing in [the Court's] existing case law
allows us to make that choice for him." 523 U.S. at 378.
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travel abroad."124
Armed with support for his prerogative from all sides, Virginia's
Governor rejected the Secretary of State's request. Indeed, the Governor's
decision was made so as to prevent what was, in his eyes, a more troubling
alternative: the delay of the execution "would have the practical effect of
transferring responsibility from the courts of the Commonwealth and the
United States to the International Court."125 According to schedule, Angel
Breard was executed on April 14, 1998.126
In Breard, politics-not law-was the central issue. "The system"
afforded the politically-convenient scapegoat that has enabled the federal
government to avoid more costly efforts to balance federalism and respect
for international human rights. In effect, the Administration's recalcitrant
performance sent a clear signal that states do have the "option" of
respecting international human rights obligations because the federal
government is unwilling to step in to insure compliance. This failure of
political will is one with troubling ramifications for human rights treaty
implementation.
5. An Uncertain State of Affairs
Despite clear textual authority in the Constitution and unambiguous
case precedent, the future course of human rights treaty-making and
implementation in the United States is uncertain. Various factors-legal,
political, and practical-form layers of resistance to the treaty process. In
the context of the evolving doctrine of anticommandeering, 127 the real
meaning of the federalism understanding, read with the non-self-executing
declaration, becomes even more uncertain. Two possibilities arise for
human rights treaty implementation: either the federalism understandings
instruct state legislatures to pass the laws required by Congress-an
interpretation plainly in tension with the anticommandeering principle; or
states are left with the option of complying with the instruction-an
interpretation plainly in tension with the constitutional scheme erected to
prevent a repeat of this very problem as it occurred under the Articles of
Confederation.128 As a matter of law, the understandings cannot mean the
124. Charney & Reisman, supra note 109, at 671 (quoting Letter from Madeleine K.
Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)).
125. Id. at 674 (quoting Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office,
Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard (Apr. 14,
1998)).
126. Bradley, Breard, supra note 110, at 538.
127. The questionable fate of an expansive preemption doctrine adds an additional layer
of complexity. See supra note 107.
128. Vazquez, Breard, supra note 108, at 1357-58. Note that, as the law now stands, even if
the anticommandeering principle were applied to the treaty context, Congress would retain
substantial authority to "encourage" states through federal funding, see, e.g., South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), or by threatening preemption, see Vazquez, Breard, supra note 108, at
1336 (explaining that, in this scenario, the federal government could conclude treaties
imposing affirmative obligations on the states in relation to activities they already perform
because states would be left with a choice between compliance with the instructions, or
[Vol. 5
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latter. And yet, if the former interpretation is adopted, how can the tension
be resolved?
This complex legal web creates a treaty scheme that is unworkable on a
conceptual level, and even more so in its real-world application. It is in this
light that these theoretical considerations are revealed as highly abstract,
and largely irrelevant. Whatever the legal meaning of federalism
understandings and the theoretical discord that may exist between these
conditions and the Court's federalism jurisprudence, the modus operandi of
this treaty scheme has been shaped by the politics of the federal system.
Breard is a powerful reminder that, regardless of formal authority, the
federal government is unwilling to encourage - much less to ensure -
substantive compliance at the local level.
A trio of revisionist scholars 29 has seized upon this uncertain state of
affairs to argue that the broad understanding of the Treaty Power reflected
in Holland should be reconsidered. These commentators have engaged in a
self-conscious attempt to develop a "new foreign affairs law," 30 portrayed
as a noble effort to rescue federalism, locked in a zero-sum struggle with
"foreign affairs orthodoxy." Curtis Bradley explains:
Faced with this conflict.. .we could, of course, abandon our
commitment to protecting federalism.. .In any event, we must
make a choice. As we continue with what is in essence an
"international New Deal," we must decide whether federalism is
worth preserving. If it is, the nationalist view of the treaty power
should be reconsidered.
131
Leading scholar-advocates in the field have joined to defend the other
side in this zero-sum debate, affirming the conventional wisdom about
treaty-making and implementation on historical, textual, and structural
grounds. 32 Their strongest argument is a structural one: that the political
safeguards of federalism have worked well - indeed, too well - to protect
state sovereignty in human rights treaty-making and implementation. The
Senate's standard package of RUDs attests to the force of these formal
structural safeguards, further strengthened by the many informal
protections afforded state sovereignty by the readiness of federal actors to
invoke the constraints of the "federal system" and pass the buck on
implementation and enforcement.
Yet, the very fact that the conventional process has allowed for these
withdrawal from the activity).
129. Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, and John Yoo.
130. Curtis Bradley, A New Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1089, 1104 (1999)
(describing this novel law as "more tolerant of state involvement in foreign affairs, more
willing to impose limits on the national government's exercise of power, and less reliant on
the judiciary to maintain foreign affairs uniformity.").
131. Curtis Bradley, Treaty Power, supra note 108, at 461-62.
132. The work of these scholars have been included throughout the discussion. Prominent
among them are Louis Henkin, Carlos Manuel Vazquez, and Martin Flaherty.
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perverse results suggests that human rights treaty-making and
implementation is not best served by assuming an antithetical relationship
between federalism and foreign affairs orthodoxy. The rigid structure of
the debate has made defenders reluctant to recognize that the challenges
posed by human rights treaty-making and implementation are unique in
ways that make the states necessary partner-participants. That an increased
role for the states has been squared against respect for international human
rights law has done a disservice to a treaty process badly in need of
rationalization and reform.
IV. RECOGNIZING A DISCRETE ROLE FOR THE STATES
As the Canadian experience instructs, the first step towards reform is
the recognition that "the system" is not a monolithic whole, antagonistic to
the treaty process, but a multiplicity of parts, each with a role in the project
of substantive rights protection. In his discussion of international norms,
Harold Koh offers a useful conceptual framework for the consideration of
this new role. Koh argues that international legal rules become integrated
into national law as binding domestic obligations in a three-part
"transnational legal process" of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization. 133 This process is a "constructivist activity" whereby a
"nation's repeated participation... is internalizing, normative, and
constitutive-of-identity." 134 Through repeat participation in processes of
"'vertical domestication' whereby international law norms 'trickle down'
and become incorporated into domestic legal systems," nations come to
obey international law.135 Because "nation states are far more likely to
comply with international law when they have accepted its legitimacy
through some internal process," Koh concludes that human rights activists
must work these vertical mechanisms by adopting new techniques, seeking
new fora, and, importantly, empowering more actors to participate in the
process.1
36
Conspicuously absent from Koh's list of relevant actors, or "process
activators," are the individual states. Nevertheless, Koh's model is relevant
to conceptualizing a new role for the states in two important ways. First,
the unique character of human rights, the RUDs attached to treaties, and
the federal government's abdication make the states a necessary "process
activator" in the "vertical domestication" through which the United States
comes to obey international law. Second, Koh's understanding of the
processes by which nations "obey" is applicable to a strategy that seeks to
promote "internalized compliance" at the state level. But how can the
states be afforded a meaningful role in the treaty scheme-one that
complements the formal process established by the Constitution and
133. Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 625-26
(1998).
134. Id. at 641.
135. Id. at 627.
136. Id. at 680.
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Holland?
A. Lessons from Canada
The Canadian Committee affords an exemplary model of a mechanism
that has reconciled federalism with respect for international human rights
law by making three central contributions to Canada's human rights treaty
scheme. First, the Committee has addressed the pragmatic problems with
consultation during the 1960s and 1970s, coordinating complex interaction
among the levels of government to ensure that all voices are heard at every
phase of the treaty process. The Committee has oiled and ordered the
machinery of inter-governmental interaction, facilitating a constructive
dialogue that has contributed to a general culture of respect for human
rights. As a continuous body that supports this dialogue, the Committee
has ensured expedient implementation and organized reporting post-
ratification.
Second, the Committee has performed an important symbolic role,
communicating to the provinces that the federal government recognizes
their shared responsibility in the realm of human rights and values
provincial voices as a relevant and influential part of the conversation.
Through the Committee, the federal government and provinces have
become teammates, rather than antagonists, in progressive human rights
protection. Importantly, this consultative "dialectical federalism" has
afforded the provinces a new, robust authority that goes beyond their
effective "veto" power (through refusal to implement), allowing the sub-
units to influence the shape and scope of international treaty creation.
Moreover, the dialectical federalism facilitated by the Committee forms
the real-world, institutional analogue to the symbolic dialogue among
human rights norms and across human rights categories, necessary for a
rich understanding of these rights.137 Cooperative interaction works to
encourage integrated consideration of rights that are themselves
interrelated and only fully complete when viewed in their normative
intersection with other rights.138 In this way, the Committee draws on the
central principle that underlies the U.N. as an institution and the noble
human rights instruments that it has produced: that "interactive
diversity ... facilitates universalism."
139
This dialectical interaction between the different governments is
137. Craig Scott, Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of "Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights," 21 HUM. RTs. Q. 633, 659.
138. Examples of intersectionality draw on concepts from North American "critical race
theory" analysis. Applying these principles to the international context, the CEDAW and CRC
would interact intersectionally when their combined mandate focuses on the "girl child,"
producing "the potential for analysis in which gender is brought to race and race to gender."
Id. at 655 (making this same argument for the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and other human rights
instruments).
139. Craig Scott, Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN High




Bell: From Laggard to Leader: Canadian Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
integrally related to the third substantive contribution that this institution
has made. The Committee has worked to include the provinces as
members of the "interpretive community" of human rights treaties by
engaging them in the creative process through which their international
obligations are negotiated, articulated, adopted, implemented and
supervised. These stages of the treaty exercise generate the "interpretive
community," creating what has been called in the literary context
"assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of
relevance and irrelevance." 140 "[T]he process of producing and living under
a treaty," one scholar explains, "generates a community.. .of people and
institutions associated with the treaty." 141 By granting the provinces a
meaningful role in the creation of human rights obligations, provincial
actors gain a stake in giving substance to ideals through implementation
and supervision. As the collective authors of the instrument, the
international values and rules enshrined seem relevant and important to
the everyday lives of Canadians living in their jurisdictions.
That this is the case is shown by the high responsiveness of the
provinces to obligations they have incurred by assenting to ratification
through the Committee mechanism. Legislative implementation has, for
the most part, been prompt, and legislative language and action
demonstrate that the provinces view themselves as members of the
"interpretive communities" of human rights treaties. 142 Over the years, the
pragmatic, symbolic, and substantive contributions of the Committee have
been the engine behind Canada's new era of human rights leadership.
B. Towards a U.S. Analogue
The three main contributions that the Committee has made to the
treaty process in Canada speak to the constructivist processes of
interaction, interpretation, internalization, and identity-constitution that
140. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMEs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989). The notion of "interpretive
communities" holds that "interpretation is constrained not by the language of the text, nor its
context, but by the 'cultural assumptions within which both texts and contexts take shape for
situated agents.'" Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 378 (1990) (paraphrasing Fish's argument).
141. Id. at 385-86.
142. Examples include the Ontario Human Rights Code and the Yukon Territory Human
Rights Act, which make explicit reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Additionally, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals has ruled that the province's human rights
legislation implements, in a general sense, Canada's and Saskatchewan's international
obligations. Similarly, a provision of Quebec's Labour Code and three provisions of its Labour
Standards Act were said to have been "inspired by a Recommendation of the International
Labour Organization." Perhaps most notable is Quebec's 1993 amendment of the Charter of
the French Language after Canada was found to be in breach of Article 19 (freedom of
expression) of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee. SCHABAS, supra note 23, at 29-30.
The province's action is testimony to the fact that, as members of the "interpretive
community" that created this international supervisory body, Quebec views the Committee's
judgment on sensitive issues as legitimate.
286 [Vol. 5
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol5/iss1/8
From Laggard to Leader
Koh identifies as essential for effective compliance in the United States.
Indeed, a U.S. analogue is easily envisioned: a Continuing Committee,
composed of representatives appointed by the state attorneys general,
which would convene biannually to include the states in the creative
process through which their international obligations are negotiated,
articulated, adopted, implemented, and reported.1 43 The U.S. Committee
would not alter the formal treaty scheme in which state interests are
represented by the Senate supermajority's advice and consent, and the
national government would remain responsible for implementation on the
international stage. Instead, like its Canadian counterpart, the U.S.
Committee would make informal but far-reaching modifications in the
process to cut back the layers of resistance that currently impede
"internalized compliance."
1. Symbolic Contributions
Like its Canadian analogue, the U.S. Committee would make a
symbolic contribution to the process, signaling to the states that the treaty
power is not locked in a zero-sum struggle with state sovereignty and
facilitating the interactive consideration of rights that are, themselves, best
conceptualized holistically. For skeptics who fear that this cooperative
dialogue would instead create a chaotic cacophony, adding another level of
resistance to the treaty process, experience is instructive. Both the success
of the U.N. in the creation of these instruments and that of Canada's
Continuing Committee in effecting treaty adherence, implementation, and
reporting attest to the fact that interactive diversity can work to facilitate
universalism. While the smaller number of provinces and the existence of a
domestic rights-protecting instrument heavily influenced by human rights
law 44 facilitate this goal in Canada, "universalism" need not contemplate
consensus pre-ratification, but rather good-faith, collaborative partnership
in a common human rights project.
2. Pragmatic Contributions
Like its Canadian counterpart, the U.S. Committee would make a
143. This Continuing Committee might even begin as one of the Standing Committees of
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG). NAAG was founded in 1907 to
facilitate interaction among the Attorneys General and chief legal officers of the 50 states, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and associated Territories (as well as
the U.S. Attorney General, an honorary member). Annual working groups, seminars, and
conferences aim to disseminate information, provide a forum for cooperation, promote
coordination on interstate matters, and increase citizen understanding of the law. Among the
Standing Committees that NAAG supports is one on civil rights. See generally
http://www.naag.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). Thus, NAAG might offer a natural place to
house a Continuing Committee on Human Rights, though the proposed Committee would
have a more robust role than the existing Standing Committees due to the discrete nature of
human rights treaty-making and implementation.
144. See supra note 20.
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pragmatic contribution to the treaty process, coordinating inter-
governmental dialogue and information exchange, and organizing
implementation and reporting post-ratification. At present, the federal
government lags in publicizing new human rights commitments and
notifying the public and local officials of their rights and enforcement
duties under these instruments. 45  Moreover, because the federal
government has refused to ensure implementation, there is little support
for follow-up legislation. In the absence of a formal reporting mechanism,
supervision is conducted in a haphazard and disorganized fashion that
fails to check for substantive compliance.146
In these respects, the Committee's pragmatic contributions would have
several positive effects. First, by facilitating repeat interaction on human
rights, the mechanism would promote a local culture of respect for
internationally recognized rights that would stimulate and support
ratification, implementation, and systematic reporting. Second, by
providing a forum for information sharing, the Committee would clarify
the specifics of treaty obligations and disseminate creative strategies for
implementation and reporting. In turn, this information exchange might
effect a "competitive federalism," 47 whereby the progressive performance
of some states sets an exemplary standard that raises the bar for others.
Third, by creating a permanent mechanism for organized reporting, the
Committee would signal to the international community and to the states
that the nation and its component parts care about substantive compliance.
Finally, through the Committee, the government could afford states an
opportunity to defend challenges against its laws before the Human Rights
Committee.148
3. Substantive Contributions
Like its Canadian counterpart, the Committee would make a
substantive contribution to the treaty process, granting the states a
meaningful voice in the interpretive community of rights and duties
formed by these treaties across stages of the process. This substantive role
145. Ginger, supra note 86, at 1355-56 (1993) (noting that "few of us... are aware that
President Jimmy Carter signed the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1977.... Neither the Senate nor
the U.S. media has mentioned that ... the U.S. Senate ... consented to the ratification of the
Covenant [nor that] ... President George Bush had this treaty deposited at the United
Nations .... To date no high (or low) federal government official has 'publicized' the
Covenant in order to familiarize the authorities responsible for human rights enforcement
with the content of the Covenant.").
146. Conversation with Harold Koh, supra note 86.
147. This is Peter Spiro's term. Peter Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 590-96 (1997) (arguing for a new doctrine of sub-national responsibility
in the realm of human rights). In particular, "[legal responsibility should mirror actual
responsibility.... [S]ome sub-national officials will come to respect human rights only when
it shames their jurisdiction and hits their pocketbooks." Id. at 596.
148. Through the Committee Mechanism, Canada afforded Quebec like opportunity to
defend its sign law in front of the Human Rights Committee. When found in breach of article
19, Quebec amended the law. See supra note 141.
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speaks to Koh's notion of the constructivist activity through which
continuous participation "is internalizing, normative, and constitutive-of-
identity." 149 As collective authors of the instruments, state actors would
come to view the international values and rules that the treaties enshrine as
relevant and important to the lives of ordinary Americans living in their
jurisdictions. The substantive effects of this interpretive community are
several.
First, by recognizing the individual agency of the states in the creation
of this "interpretive community," the Committee would allow for
progressive departure from the standard package of RUDs. States with
laws that already conform to reserved treaty requirements, and others
willing to adapt local law, would be afforded the independent choice to
agree unconditionally to the reserved provisions (outside of the Senate,
where various factors distort decision making).15° The progressive example
set by these states might spark a positive "competitive federalism," raising
the bar for other states. Moreover, as collective authors of the interpretive
community, these states would be less inclined to view the reserved
provisions as threatening to inconsistent state laws and would, in turn, be
more likely to adopt legislative changes that would enable unconditional
agreement to the treaty terms. The Committee would then serve to channel
these individual expressions of assent through the national government,
which might condition acceptance of the treaty provisions on the
international stage, except in those sub-federal jurisdictions assenting to
the terms. Importantly, the failure of a state to assent to ratification would
change neither national nor local binding obligations under the treaty, and
the federal government would accept responsibility for the breach of the
conditioned provisions by states that assented to the terms
unconditionally. 151 For skeptics who worry that this scheme would create
inconsistent standards of implementation across jurisdictions, today's
status quo has had a like effect. RUDs and government abdication have
produced inconsistency, without the Committee scheme's corresponding
incentives and opportunities for unconditioned treaty accession. The
notion is that "one would prefer any number of such sub-national
participants, relative to the alternative of no coverage as prevails under the
existing system of treaty accession."
15 2
A second substantive effect of the Committee is one of process
legitimacy. By affording states a meaningful role in the formulation of their
obligations, state actors will not only be more inclined toward
unconditioned ratification, but they will gain a stake in giving effect to the
treaties post-ratification through implementation, supervision, and
149. Koh, supra note 133, at 641.
150. See Spiro, supra note 147, at 590 (citing the example of the ICCPR's ban on execution
of juvenile offenders as a case where about half of the states already prohibit such executions).
151. Id. at 592. Spiro notes that this "opt-in" model of treaty accession has been adopted in
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, whereby the national government is held
responsible for only the sub-national governments with respect to which acceptance was
notified.
152. Id. at 590-91.
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systematic reporting. In this way, the Committee would work to promote
internalized compliance with treaty obligations at the local level by
including states as members of the interpretive community.
The third substantive effect of the Committee relates to its role in
identifying the states as a key strategic link in the process of "vertical
domestication." Internalized compliance at the local level is fundamental to
substantive compliance nationally. Indeed, because of the role states must
play in implementing human rights obligations, it is largely sub-unit
cooperation that will determine whether the United States improves on its
"laggard" reputation in future years. It is also state governments that have
a more direct relationship with the individual rights-bearers, and thus the
greatest power to effect internalization of human rights norms at the local
level. Today, few people take account of their "human rights" in everyday
life because the process of their articulation is insular and far-removed,
confined to the federal machinery. And yet, the human rights regime is
only fully meaningful when it touches the lives that it seeks to protect and
ameliorate. By including state representatives as members of the
interpretive communities formed through the treaty process, the
Committee would promote the diffusion of human rights consciousness at
the grassroots level 53 and a sense of local interconnectedness to the greater
world community.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the creation of a discrete mechanism for
human rights treaty-making and implementation in the United States
would make symbolic, pragmatic, and substantive contributions to a
scheme badly in need of rationalization and reform. Both the official policy
of qualified adherence and academic criticism on each side of the debate
have done the values of federalism and international human rights law a
disservice by adopting a zero-sum view of the relationship between the
two, restricting the range of creative solutions in play. And yet the
resulting arrangement has satisfied neither the states' rights advocates nor
the defenders of the treaty power.
The Canadian experience offers an instructive model of a human rights
treaty mechanism that has reconciled federalism with deep respect for
international human rights law by recognizing a role for the provinces as
partner-participants at all stages of the process. Drawing on this model, the
proposed U.S. analogue offers improvements in the process that respond to
both camps of concern. For states' rights advocates, the scheme provides a
more robust role for sub-federal authority, granting states authorship of
their treaty obligations. For defenders of foreign affairs orthodoxy, the U.S.
Committee offers a chance to move beyond the limiting effects of the RUDs
and the federal government's abdication by tapping the individual states as
153. For a discussion of human rights at the local level, in the context of the ICCPR, see
generally Ginger, supra note 86.
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"process activators" in substantive human rights protection.
In the face of the incoherence of the present scheme and the uncertain
course of the Court's jurisprudence, a new human rights treaty mechanism
is in order and within reach. The creation of a U.S. analogue to Canada's
Committee would demand perseverance and impose costs. And yet, the
unique quality of human rights demands nothing less. By recognizing a
new role for the states in human rights treaty-making and implementation,
the United States may find the key to a successful transition from human
rights laggard to leader. Only one crucial distinction between the Canadian
and U.S. experiences blocks this path: the honest will to invest in a
workable solution, beneficial to federalism and international human rights
law.
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